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Abstract 
Do higher wages elicit reciprocity and hence higher effort? In a field experiment with 266 
employees, we find that paying above-market wages, per se, does not have an effect on 
effort relative to paying market wages. However, structuring a portion of the wage as a 
clear and unexpected gift (by offering a raise with no further conditions after the 
employee has accepted the contract – with no future employment) does lead to higher 
effort for the duration of the job.  Targeted gifts are more efficient than hiring more 
workers.  However, the mechanism makes this unlikely to explain persistent above-
market wages. 
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1.  Introduction 
Economists have long recognized that employees are often paid more than the market 
clearing wage, and that unemployed workers do not bid wages down to the point where 
supply equals demand. The neoclassical explanation for this phenomenon comes in the 
form  of  efficiency  wage  theories,  generally  arguing  that  employees  will  work  harder 
when they receive high wages because they do not want to lose a high-paying job (Katz 
1986). This type of mechanism relies on repeated interactions between employers and 
employees.  In  one-time  jobs  without  any  consideration  for  future  employment,  the 
neoclassical model would argue that efficiency wages do not increase effort. 
At the same time, a robust literature based in behavioral economics demonstrates that 
people care about fairness, and that these fairness considerations may create incentives 
for reciprocation.  If you give a gift to someone, that person will reciprocate – even in a 
one-shot game with no potential for future interaction (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Falk et al 
2008). This principle has been implemented in field settings as well. For example, Falk 
(2007) shows that including a small gift in a fundraising letter leads to higher donation 
levels.  
In  the  context  of  labor  economics,  fairness  concerns  and  reciprocity  have  been 
offered as an explanation for efficiency wages (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 1990, 
Fehr et al 2009).   If employees view high wages as a gift, then they may reciprocate by 
working harder even though there is no financial incentive to do so.  The thrust of this 
argument is that the market wage serves as a reference point, and employees will reward 
positive deviations from this reference point – even in a one-shot employment contract 
with no career concerns. 
Do employees work harder when they are paid more? Laboratory experiments have 
mostly shown that paying an unconditional bonus before the work starts causes workers 
to reciprocate by working harder (e.g. Fehr et al 1993, Fehr and Gachter 2000, Hannan et 
al 2002, Charness 2004). In seminal work in the field, Gneezy and List (2006) look at 
two field settings, hiring roughly 40 workers to test whether paying higher than market 
wages  increases  output  in  a  library  data  entry  task  and  door-to-door  fundraising. 
Specifically,  Gneezy  and  List  compare  the  output  of  workers  assigned  to  a  “gift” 
treatment, in which workers are hired at a low wage and then offered a raise immediately 	 ﾠ 3 
before starting work, with the output of workers assigned to a “nongift” treatment, in 
which workers are hired at and paid the low wage. They find that workers who receive 
the “gift” (i.e., the additional money) exert higher effort for the first few hours of the task 
but that the effect wears off after a few hours and that, in their case, the temporary 
increase in productivity does not justify its cost.  
However, because prior research has not varied the base wage, the set-up cannot 
identify whether reciprocity is triggered because wages are above the market rate (which 
is the argument laid out in the literature that uses reciprocity to explain observed above-
market wages) or because workers suddenly receive the gift of an unexpected raise after 
having already agreed to a job. In other words, wage amount (high vs. low) is confounded 
with wage structure (surprise vs. no surprise).  In this paper, we offer a large-scale gift 
exchange experiment in a field setting where we vary both whether or not a worker 
receives an unexpected raise before starting work as well as the base wage offered to 
potential hires. This subtle difference allows us to differentiate between how unexpected 
“gifts” and above-market wages affect performance.  
Our results show that the structure of the gift is central to generating reciprocity: 
simply hiring at and paying workers a high wage ($4) has no effect at all compared with 
hiring at and paying workers a low wage ($3).  However, hiring workers at a low wage 
and then offering them an unexpected raise ($3+$1) significantly increases performance.  
One common model of reciprocity in labor markets (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 
1990) assumes that high wages are the determinant of reciprocation – a model that does 
not differentiate between our 3+1 and 4 offers.  Field experiments have similarly not 
differentiated between these two treatments.  
Our experiment takes place on oDesk, an online labor market with several million 
registered contractors. Using the oDesk platform allows us to vary wages and gifts in a 
setting  where  workers  are  accustomed  to  tasks  like  ours.    We  use  the  natural  field 
experiment  method,  meaning  that  the  employees  do  not  know  that  this  is  part  of  an 
experiment.  Additionally, using oDesk allows us to hire workers with varying levels of 
work experience on the platform so that we can analyze precisely how experience and the 
reference  point  it  sets  interact  with  reactions  to  the  gift.  Importantly,  the  oDesk 
marketplace allows us to conduct targeted hiring by directly inviting workers to take up 	 ﾠ 4 
our job instead of simply posting a job publicly and waiting for applications. This means 
we are able to hire workers at different base wages (without individuals knowing how 
much others have been paid) so that we can test whether it is the base wage or the 
unexpected gift that affects performance. Normally selection would be a concern when 
hiring  at  different  wages  but  the  take  up  rate  is  95%  among  workers  with  prior 
experience.  Furthermore, recruiting through oDesk means we are additionally able to 
compare and control for the entire oDesk work histories of our employees. 
Our  experimental  design,  which  we  describe  in  more  detail  in  the  next  section, 
proceeds by hiring three groups of oDesk workers for a data entry task, all of whom 
request wages less than $3 per hour according to their oDesk profiles. We are clear in our 
recruitment messages that this is a one-time job. The first group is hired at $3 per hour 
(i.e., the “3” condition).  The second group is also hired at $3 per hour, but before starting 
work group two is then told that we unexpectedly have extra money in the budget and 
will pay an extra $1 per hour, so that the total they will receive is $4 per hour (“3+1”). 
The third group is hired directly at $4 per hour so the fact that we are paying them the 
higher above-market wage does not signal a “gift” in a salient way (“4”). To ensure the 
validity of the results, we choose a data entry task (entering CAPTCHAs, to be described 
in more detail later) that is fairly common on online labor markets and we only recruited 
workers who listed data entry as a specialty on their oDesk profiles.  
Consistent with the notion of reciprocity, we find that higher wages that include a 
surprise gift after hiring the employee (3+1) lead to higher and more persistent effort 
across our task relative to the other two groups (3 and 4).  More specifically, paying 
$3+$1 yielded a 20% increase in productivity compared to paying $4, with no additional 
cost.  Compared to paying $3, paying $3+$1 resulted in a 20% increase in productivity 
with a 33% increase in cost. Notably, the effect is strongest for the workers for whom the 
gift  is  most  likely  to  be  salient:  employees  with  the  lowest  prior  wages,  the  most 
experience (who are more familiar with the standard wage structure on oDesk), and those 
who have worked most recently. Among this first group (i.e., those with the lowest prior 
wages), the percentage increase in productivity is actually greater than the percentage 
increase in cost even when we compare $3+$1 with $3. However, we find that varying 
the base wage from $3 to $4 in the original contract has no statistically distinguishable 	 ﾠ 5 
effect on productivity – in fact, the point estimate of the effect is 0.   These results help to 
shed light on the situations in which we should expect to see reciprocity in labor markets. 
Prior work has focused largely on students with presumably little or no experience with 
the task at hand, and found small effects.  In contrast, we find a large, persistent effect 
driven by workers with prior experience doing similar work in a natural field setting.  
Moreover, ours is the first to include the 4 condition – allowing us to better understand 
the underlying mechanisms driving reciprocity. 
Altogether, our results suggest that unexpected gifts (3+1) targeted at those who 
least expect them can increase productivity – sometimes in a cost-effective manner – but 
that such reciprocity is due to the unexpected nature of the gift and not simply due to the 
fact that a worker is receiving a higher, above-market wage. Indeed our results suggest 
that reciprocity and gift giving are unlikely to explain most efficiency wages as we see 
them in the world around us because high wages written into the initial wage contract do 
not seem to elicit any productivity increase.   
 
2.  Experimental Design 
Our experimental methodology proceeded in three steps. First, we selected a sample of 
oDesk workers and notified the treated workers that we had a job for them and invited 
them to accept our job offer. Then, treated workers who accepted our job offers were, if 
appropriate (i.e., in the 3+1 condition), notified of a change in their wages. Finally, all 
treated workers were sent a link to a website where they could complete our data entry 
task. We describe these steps in more detail below. 
 
2.1 Sample 
Our sample selection began by restricting the universe of oDesk workers to those who are 
experts in data entry by requiring that (a) worker profiles are returned by a keyword 
search for “data entry” and (b) workers classify themselves as Administrative Support 
workers with a Data Entry specialty. We further restricted the sample to workers that list 
a requested hourly wage of between $2.22 and $3.33. Since oDesk charges workers a 
10% fee on gross earnings, this restriction amounts to restricting the sample to workers 
requesting net hourly wages of between $2 and $3. Finally, we restricted the sample to 	 ﾠ 6 
workers  that  (1)  had  logged  into  oDesk  within  the  last  30  days,  (2)  are  independent 
contractors (unaffiliated with a larger company), and (3) are listed as “oDesk ready”, 
which means they have passed a multiple choice exam that tests their knowledge of the 
oDesk interface.  A total of 17,482 workers satisfied these joint criteria at the time of data 
collection. 
From  this  set  of  workers,  we  randomly  selected  540  workers  and  allocated  them 
randomly across our 3 treatments.
4 We then invited these workers to take up our task over 
the course of 8 recruitment waves. Figure 1, Panel A presents the initial recruitment 
messages. 266 workers accepted our offers of employment, an overall take-up rate of 
49%.
5 
  
2.2 Treatments 
  Workers were randomized into three treatment groups – Figure 2 presents our 
experimental design. Workers in two of the treatment groups were offered $3 per hour 
while workers in the third group were offered $4 per hour.  (Technically, we would pay 
$3.33 and $4.44, respectively, because 10% of gross wages go to oDesk.) We refer to $4 
per hour as the gift condition, since these employees are receiving more than the $3 per 
hour (despite being pulled from the same set of potential employees).  This treatment 
largely goes ignored in the literature, despite the fact that the literature often describes 
high wages as a gift.  We feel this treatment is important as it allows us to tease out 
mechanisms behind the gift effect.  The two groups who had been offered $3 per hour are 
split into salient gift (3+1) and no gift (3). After accepting our job offer, workers in the 
salient gift treatment (3+1) were notified that we “have a bigger budget than expected … 
[and that] we will pay …  $4 per hour instead of $3 per hour”.  
Workers  in  all  treatments  were  then  reminded  of  the  task  instructions  and 
presented with a link to a webpage where the task was located. Figure 1, Panel B presents 
the messages we sent to workers to let them know we had agreed to hire them, and Figure 
2 summarizes the experimental set up. Figure 3 presents a screenshot of the data entry 
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4 We oversampled the $3/hour treatment because those workers participated in a post-experiment trust-
building exercise described and analyzed in a companion paper. 
5 As detailed below, the take up rate was dramatically different among experienced and inexperienced 
workers: after excluding the 36 workers described below, the overall yield was 46%, but the yield among 
inexperienced workers was 22% while the yield was 95% among experienced workers. 	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task, in which we asked workers to correctly enter as many CAPTCHAs as they can in 
the four hours allotted. CAPTCHA is an acronym for “Completely Automated Public 
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart”, which is a system that asks you to 
transcribe a word or phrase that is presented to you as a picture. Many online companies 
use  CAPTCHAs  to  prevent  automated  software  from  easily  accessing  information  or 
making decisions without a human being involved.  For example, Ticketmaster requires 
potential purchasers to enter a CAPTCHA before purchasing tickets in order to stop a 
person from writing programs to repeatedly buy tickets (which is something that a scalper 
may otherwise do). On online labor markets such as oDesk, there is a high level of 
demand for people to do data entry (and in fact, even specifically to enter CAPTCHAs, 
which can be used for future programming needs), which means that our task would 
come across as a reasonably natural request.  
In our analysis, we exclude results from 12 workers who did not complete the 4 
hours of work, as well as 24 workers in the initial wave who were able to complete more 
than 4 hours of work due to a technical glitch that allowed them to exceed the time limit.
6 
We are left with 230 employees, all of whom are included in our analysis.
 7 This means 
we have an effective yield of 46%.
8  
Table 1 presents worker characteristics before the experiment. We first present 
statistics for all workers, in Panel A, and then statistics on the subsample of experienced 
workers, in Panel B. Within each panel, the first set of three columns present statistics, 
separated by treatment group, for those who did not accept our job offer; the second set 
of  three  columns  presents  analogous  statistics  for  those  who  did  take  up  our  job. 
Although  our  overall  take  up  rate  was  46%,  95%  of  offers  were  accepted  among 
employees  with  prior  experience  (who  are  driving  our  main  results).  Moreover,  job 
acceptance  rates  were  similar  across  treatment  groups  –  as  were  other  worker 
characteristics. The only notable difference (which is still not statistically significant) 
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6 There was no difference across the three treatment groups on the likelihood of employees working for 
more or less than 4 hours; we excluded these workers because allowing employees to work for different 
lengths of time makes it harder to compare total productivity across employees. Including these employees 
in the analysis does not change our baseline results, however; see Appendix Table 1. 
7 We also ran a parallel experiment testing for career concerns where we instead told participants that ”we 
expect to have more work in the future.”  We analyze the impact of that statement in a separate paper. 
8 Calculated as 230/(540-36) = 46%.   	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across groups is that the number of prior jobs is lower in the 4 group than in the 3+1 and 
3 groups. In aggregate, the data suggests that the experimental design is valid.
9  
 
 
3.  Results 
This section documents the main results of the paper.   
3.1 Main Effect: 3+1>4=3 
The gift literature has posited that high wages may elicit reciprocity, which could 
in  turn  rationalize  above-market  wages  even  in  a  one-shot  labor  employment.  This 
suggests that market wages might be a reference point, and that paying more would elicit 
more effort.  In this case, our 4 and 3+1 conditions should elicit the same response, which 
would be higher than the 3 condition.  To our knowledge, we are the first to include a 4 
treatment, which allows us to shed light on the conditions under which we should expect 
workers to reciprocate high wages.   
Our main finding is that the response to the 4 and 3+1 treatments is very different.  
At  the  same  time,  the  estimates  for  the  3  and  4  treatments  are  statistically 
indistinguishable from one another. The gift only matters if the wage is structured in a 
way that the gift component is made salient (e.g., by presenting it separately, when it is 
unexpected). Figure 4 presents the main effect.  Paying 4 elicits the same amount of 
effort as paying 3. However, The 3+1 group correctly entered 146 more CAPTCHAs 
relative  to  both  groups  over  the  course  of  the  task,  a  20%  increase.  This  result  is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 2 presents the main effect in regression 
form, where all measurements are relative to the 3+1 treatment. Column (1) presents 
results from a regression of the total number of completed correct CAPTCHAs on a 
constant and dummies for wages of 3 and 4, respectively. The point estimates of 3 and 4 
are nearly identical, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are the same. Column 
(2)  of  Table  2  presents  results  in  log  form.  As  before,  we  find  the  3+1  treatment 
outperforms  the  other  two  groups,  which  are  statistically  indistinguishable  from  each 
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9 As a robustness check against selective take up, we repeated the analysis in Table 1 in which we compare 
characteristics across treatments but this time pooling the 3 and 3+1 treatments since these treatments were 
hired at the same wage. The results are excluded here but none of the differences between the pooled 
treatments hired at $3/hour and the treatment hired at $4/hour were statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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other.  In column (3), we show that the treatment effect measured in number of correct 
CAPTCHAs entered is not due to a change in the ratio of correct to incorrect entries. The 
estimates for all treatments are statistically indistinguishable from one another.  
Although our sample is balanced on observables and take up rates were similar 
across all treatments (see Table 1), we conduct an additional robustness check to verify 
that our result that 3+1>4 is not driven due to selection induced by hiring at different 
wages. That is, a potential explanation for why 4 performs worse than 3+1 is that less-
able workers refused the job invitation for $3/hour but those same kinds of workers did 
accept the job invitation for $4/hour. Such a scenario could lead us to falsely conclude 
that the 3+1>4 when really selection was driving the result. Note, however, that such a 
scenario is counter-intuitive since usually one would expect that selection would lead to 
the opposite conclusion: selective take up would likely lead better workers to be more 
likely to accept the higher wage job. To test whether selective take up is driving our 
result,  we  run  a  regression  where  all  non-takers  are  coded  as  having  completed  0 
CAPTCHAs and all takers are coded as normal. If the differential yield is driving our 
results and the incentive provided by 4 is actually equivalent to that provided by 3+1, 
then  4  should  perform  at  least  as  well  as  3+1  in  this  regression  since  here  we  are 
estimating an average treatment effect conditional on job invitation instead of an average 
treatment  effect  conditional  on  job  take  up.  We  report  the  results  in  column  2  of 
Appendix Table 1. The 3+1 treatment still performs better than 4 and the difference 
remains statistically significant at the 10% level. We conclude that our results are not 
driven by selection.    
Our main result contrasts with Gneezy and List (2006), Kube et al (2012), and 
concurrent but independent work by Esteves-Sorenson and Macera (2013), who all find 
mild  to  no  effects  of  gifts  in  the  field  when  hiring  undergraduate  students  for  field 
experiments (although Kube et al 2012 find that nonfinancial gifts do have a significant 
effect).  In all of these settings, workers presumably had little or no prior experience 
doing the task they were assigned. In section 3.2, we analyze how experience interacts 
with impact of the salient gift in our setting. Consistent with previous work, we find no 
effect among workers without prior experience. However, we do find large effects for 
employees  with  prior  data  entry  experience.  Among  experienced  workers,  the  3+1 	 ﾠ 10 
treatment is always efficient relative to the 4 treatment, and sometimes even efficient 
relative to the 3 (relative to hiring more workers).   Our findings are also related to Cohn 
et al (forthcoming), who find evidence of reciprocity among employees who viewed their 
initial wage as unfair.   
 
3.1.1  Does the effect of a gift wear off? 
  The final column in Table 2 examines worker performance by treatment over the 
course of the task. Our task database recorded the timestamp of every CAPTCHA entry, 
so we are able to examine the time series of responses. Sometimes workers take breaks 
however, so in order to break the task time into 4 quarters, we first truncate any gaps 
between CAPTCHA entry that are longer than 10 minutes to just 10 minutes, and then we 
break  the  total  time  between  the  first  and  the  last  CAPTCHA  entry  (with  truncated 
breaks) into 4 equal blocks of time.
10 The un-interacted treatment coefficients in the top 
rows show that that the salient gift workers completed an average of 32 to 33 more 
correct CAPTCHAs in the first quarter of the task, and this difference is significant at the 
5% level for the 3 group and at the 10% level for the 4 group.    
In order to examine the effect of the salient gift over the course of the experiment, 
we present in the bottom panel of Table 2 the sum of the treatment and treatment-quarter 
estimates. The salient gift treatment outperformed the other treatments in all quarters by 
30 to 40 CAPTCHAs. We infer from these results that the salient gift treatment increased 
productivity across the length of the task. Levitt and List (2012) suggest that lab evidence 
on reciprocity may not generalize to the field because of the short-term nature of the 
response (as found in Gneezy and List 2006).  While the effect of a single gift will clearly 
not permanently persist, our results show that the impact of a gift is not necessarily as 
ephemeral as some of the previous evidence has shown.  
 
3.2 Does experience matter? 
  The main effect shows that high wages increase effort only when the wage comes 
as  a  surprise.  In  Table  3,  we  examine  whether  the  impact  of  the  salient  gift  differs 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10 We chose to truncate gaps of longer than 10 minutes because oDesk takes screenshots of its workers to 
verify their focus and 10 minutes is the time between screenshots, so a break longer than 10 minutes is 
likely to represent true time away from the task. 	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according to a worker’s experience. If the mechanism for the impact of the gift is indeed 
its saliency then one would expect that the impact of the salient gift would be higher for 
workers with stronger priors on what to expect; e.g., workers with more experience. Of 
course, there are other reference points that may be shaping perceptions and effort as 
well. We find that the impact of the salient gift is largest for experienced employees and, 
among experienced employees, those with more prior jobs and those who have worked 
most recently. 
In the first specification (column 1), we regress the number of completed correct 
CAPTCHAs on dummies for the non-salient-gift treatments, a dummy for whether that 
worker has prior experience on oDesk, and the experienced dummy interacted with the 
non-gift treatments. The estimates on the base treatment indicators – i.e., the treatment 
effects  for  the  inexperienced  –  are  not  significantly  different  from  0.  However,  the 
treatment effects for the experienced workers – the addition of the baseline treatment 
effect and the treatment-experienced interaction term, presented in the bottom panel – are 
smaller  and  statistically  significantly  different  from  0,  indicating  that  our  estimated 
salient gift effect is concentrated among experienced users. See Figure 5 for a visual 
presentation of this result. 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 further narrow the sample of users who have 
characteristics associated with a large reaction to the salient gift. Column (2) repeats the 
analysis in column (1) but restricts the sample to experienced workers and examines 
whether the number of prior jobs affected the impact of the treatment by splitting the 
analysis  along  workers  that  have  had  more  prior  jobs  than  the  median  of  prior  jobs 
(which was 6). Although we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the gift effect is the 
same in both groups (the interaction terms are all insignificant), we see that the salient 
gift  effect  has  a  larger  magnitude  among  the  workers  with  the  most  experience  by 
comparing the estimates in the top rows with those in the bottom panel. This is shown 
graphically in Figure 6. Finally, in column (3), we present results from an analogous 
regression examining how the salient gift effect differs by how recently a worker has 
worked. We find that the effect is most pronounced among those workers who have 
worked in the last 30 days. Figure 7 presents this result graphically. 
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3.3 Do prior wages matter? 
  Table 4 mirrors the analysis in Table 3, this time examining how the level of an 
employee’s  prior  wages  earned  in  previous  jobs  on  the  platform  (which  are  publicly 
available) interacts with performance. Like experience, prior wages are likely to serves as 
a reference point that shapes the perceptions of the employees. Overall, the data suggest 
that  the  wage  offered  relative  to  this  possible  reference  point  does  increase  effort, 
although we cannot differentiate between whether the impact of the salient gift differed 
due to its size relative to prior wages or due to the fact that workers with different prior 
wages are simply different kinds of workers. Note that this analysis requires us to restrict 
the  sample  to  only  those  workers  who  had  prior  wages  on  their  profile  –  that  is, 
experienced  workers  who  whose  previous  employment  included  hourly  (and  not  just 
fixed-price) jobs.  
In the first two columns, we see that the number of CAPTCHAs completed by 
workers in the 3+1 treatment is decreasing in their prior wages, and that the effect is the 
opposite for workers in the $3/hour and $4/hour treatment groups. Column (1) groups 
these two treatments and column (2) separates them. Note that the coefficient on the 
interaction  term  for  the  3+1  group  is  statistically  significantly  different  from  the 
coefficient on the interaction term for the other groups, but that the coefficients on the 
interaction term for the 3 and 4 groups are statistically indistinguishable. These results 
show that workers with different prior wages responded the same way to 3 and 4 – i.e., 
that workers with higher prior wages completed more CAPTCHAS – but that the salient 
gift (3+1) resulted in more CAPTCHA completions for those with lower prior wages.  
Overall, the gift seems to have the largest effect for low-wage workers.    
  In columns (3) and (4), we break out the treatment effect by the median of prior 
wages, which was $1.67/hour, and we present cumulative treatment effects for above 
median average prior wages in the bottom panel. These results mirror those in columns 
(1) and (2) and show that the analysis is not driven by the linear specification. In the most 
general specification in column (4), we see that the salient gift significantly increased 
mean productivity in the below-median average prior wage group by nearly 389 and 429 
CAPTCHAs compared to the 3 and 4 treatment groups, respectively, while the increase 
in mean productivity in the above-median average prior wage groups is much smaller, 	 ﾠ 13 
around 100, and not statistically significant. This result is presented graphically in Figure 
8. An effect of this magnitude suggests that for the workers who previously earned wages 
below the median of our sample, the salient gift treatment is actually more efficient than 
the $3/hour treatment in terms of CAPTCHA completions per dollar expenditure – the 
$1/hour gift increased average CAPTCHA completion from 723 to 1112 for this group, a 
54% increase in productivity, while cost increased only 33%. Of course, we note here 
that  in  our  results,  the  salient  gift  is  always  efficient  (and  nearly  always  statistically 
significantly so) relative to the $4/hour treatment. 
 
4.  Discussion 
Our results suggest that providing employees with an unexpected pay increase can 
increase productivity – even when there is no prospect for future employment.  However, 
high wages that actually look like the types of efficiency wages we usually see in the 
field did not have the same impact on productivity as our salient gift treatment, and in 
fact had no discernible effect at all.  
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Figure 1: Job offer messages 
Panel A: Recruitment messages 
All treatments 
We are currently looking to hire a group of people to help with simple data entry.  The 
job consists of looking at a photograph of a word, and typing that word into the space 
provided.  This is a four-hour job, with the goal of entering as much data as possible 
while minimizing the number of mistakes. Specifically, we need as many correctly 
entered words as possible in four hours because we need the data for a future task and 
only correct entries can be used. You will have seven days to complete the task. 
 
You will be paid $3 ($4) per hour. Therefore, your total payment for the four hours will 
be $12 ($16). We hope you will accept this job. 
 
Panel B: Acceptance messages 
Treatments: 3 & 4 
Great, you are hired.  
 
By the way, we want you to know that this is a one time job; we do not expect to have 
more work in the future. 
 
Below, you will find a link to a page where you will do the data entry.  As we mentioned, 
the job consists of looking at a photograph of a word, and typing that word into the space 
provided.  Please enter words for four hours, after which you will be ineligible to receive 
further pay.  Finally, please take no more than a week.  We will not accept work done 
more than seven days after you receive this assignment. 
 
Link to job: here 
 
Treatment: 3+1 
Great, you are hired. As it turns out, we have a bigger budget than expected.  Therefore, 
we will pay you $4 per hour instead of $3 per hour, so the total you can earn is $16.  
 
By the way, we want you to know that this is a one time job; we do not expect to have 
more work in the future. 
 
Below, you will find a link to a page where you will do the data entry.  As we mentioned, 
the job consists of looking at a photograph of a word, and typing that word into the space 
provided.  Please enter words for four hours, after which you will be ineligible to receive 
further pay.  Finally, please take no more than a week.  We will not accept work done 
more than seven days after you receive this assignment. 
 
Link to job: here 
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Figure 2: Experimental design 
 
 
Figure 3: CAPTCHA task 
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Figure 4: The gift leads to higher productivity than either high or low base wages 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Effects are more pronounced for those with any experience 
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Figure 6: Effects are more pronounced for experienced workers  
with more prior jobs 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Effects are more pronounced for experienced workers  
with recent experience 
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Figure 8: Effects are more pronounced for experienced workers 
 with lower prior wages 
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Table 1: Worker characteristics
 
 
   
Treatment: Wage = 3 3+1 4 3 3+1 4
Taker No No No Yes Yes Yes
Experienced 0.021 0.048 0.029 0.691 0.69 0.629
(0.301) (0.527) (0.987) (0.482)
Number of prior jobs 0.162 0.238 1 8.082 7.397 4.548
(0.881) (0.194) (0.719) (0.185)
Wage requested 2.646 2.678 2.666 2.741 2.738 2.815
(0.675) (0.884) (0.972) (0.392)
N 142 63 69 110 58 62
Take up rate 44% 48% 47%
Treatment: Wage = 3 3+1 4 3 3+1 4
Taker No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of prior jobs 7.667 5 34.50 11.70 10.72 7.231
(0.757) (0.0231) (0.703) (0.236)
Wage requested 3.053 2.777 2.775 2.761 2.750 2.882
(0.585) (0.998) (0.909) (0.234)
Avg prior wage 1.769 1.494 2.233 1.706 1.957 1.908
(0.716) (0.397) (0.191) (0.828)
Avg prior rating 4.957 4.503 4.615 4.565 4.548 4.495
(0.285) (0.802) (0.913) (0.759)
Worked in last 30 days 0.333 0 1 0.447 0.525 0.410
(0.314) (0.0301) (0.429) (0.311)
N 3 3 2 76 40 39
Take up rate 96% 93% 95%
Panel A: All workers
Panel B: Experienced workers
Notes:Variable means are presented in the first row, followed by p-values from a T-test comparing a given sample 
with the analogous  3+1 treatment in the second row. 26 experienced workers did not have an average prior wage 
because all their prior jobs were fixed price contracts. These workers are excluded from the calculation of statistics 
using "Avg prior wage" above: for these statistics there are only respectively 66, 33, and 30 observations in the taker 
3, 3+1, and 4 groups Similarly, 8 experienced workers did had have prior ratings because their first and only contract 
was ongoing at the time of the experiment, so there are only respectively 72, 38, and 37 observations in the taker 3, 
3+1, and 4 groups used in calculating those statistics.	 ﾠ 21 
Table 2: Performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Correct log(Correct) Perc. correct Correct rate
Wage = 3+1 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Wage = 3 -146.4** -0.286*** -1.224 -32.97**
(67.93) (0.100) (1.433) (16.23)
Wage = 4 -146.8** -0.214** -0.797 -32.44*
(69.36) (0.0990) (1.335) (16.54)
Quarter = 1 omitted
Quarter = 2 16.12*
(8.698)
Quarter = 3 18.33*
(11.02)
Quarter = 4 20.64
(13.62)
Wage = 3 x Quarter 2 2.161
(10.09)
Wage = 3 x Quarter 3 -6.182
(13.02)
Wage = 3 x Quarter 4 -10.52
(15.05)
Wage = 4 x Quarter 2 -7.685
(10.16)
Wage = 4 x Quarter 3 -8.070
(12.76)
Wage = 4 x Quarter 4 -1.880
(15.42)
Constant 938.5 6.754 85.33 219.9
(55.04) (0.0565) (0.980) (12.87)
Treatment effects by quarter:
       [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x Quarter 2] -30.81
(18.94)
       [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x Quarter 3] -39.15**
(19.77)
       [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x Quarter 4] -43.49**
(19.15)
       [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x Quarter 2] -40.13**
(18.56)
       [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x Quarter 3] -40.51**
(20.22)
       [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x Quarter 4] -34.32*
(20.50)
Observations 230 230 230 920
Adjusted R-squared 0.017 0.017 -0.006 0.0014
Notes: Columns 1 through 3 present results from regressions on worker-level observations, while column 4 
presents results from regressions conducted on observations at the worker-quarter level. Treatment effects by 
quarter in the bottom panel are computed by taking the linear combination of a treatment dummy and the 
interaction of a treatment dummy with a quarter dummy. Standard errors for column 4 are clustered at the 
respondent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   	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Table 3: Experience 
 
   
Table 3: Experience
(1) (2) (3)
Correct Correct Correct
Wage = 3+1 omitted omitted omitted
Wage = 3 -27.34 -197.0 -120.9
(105.3) (120.1) (100.9)
Wage = 4 -127.8 -49.71 -65.93
(105.5) (110.9) (103.5)
Experienced 111.2
(104.3)
Wage = 3 x Experienced -172.5
(136.2)
Wage = 4 x Experienced -19.46
(137.5)
Num prior jobs ≥ median 164.1
(142.9)
Wage = 3 x (Num prior jobs ≥ median) -30.32
(172.7)
Wage = 4 x (Num prior jobs ≥ median) -197.7
(177.1)
Worked last 30 days 84.66
(141.5)
Wage = 3 x Worked last 30 days -161.8
(170.4)
Wage = 4 x Worked last 30 days -174.6
(172.9)
Constant 861.8 853.7 928.6
(75.23) (87.19) (75.58)
Treatment effects by worker type:
      [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x Experienced] -199.9**
(86.46)
      [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x Experienced] -147.3*
(88.27)
      [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x (Num prior jobs ≥ median)] -227.4*
(124.0)
      [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x (Num prior jobs ≥ median)] -247.4*
(138.1)
      [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x Worked in last 30 days] -282.7**
(137.3)
      [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x Worked in last 30 days] -240.6*
(138.5)
Sample all experienced experienced
Observations 230 155 155
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.071 0.051
Notes: Treatment effects by worker type in the bottom panel are computed by taking the linear 
combination of a treatment dummy and the interaction of a treatment dummy with a worker 
characteristic. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   	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Table 4: Gift relative to prior wages 
  
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Correct Correct Correct Correct
Wage = 3+1 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Wage = 3 -614.1*** -627.1*** -390.0** -388.7**
(206.9) (214.4) (157.9) (161.0)
Wage = 4 -650.1*** -614.8*** -425.9*** -429.2**
(212.8) (233.9) (161.7) (166.2)
Wage = 3+1 x Avg prior wage -129.4** -129.4**
(64.23) (64.49)
Wage not = 3+1 x Avg prior wage 72.11*
(41.47)
Wage = 3 x Avg prior wage 79.71
(51.87)
Wage = 4 x Avg prior wage 53.60
(64.80)
Avg prior wage ≥ median -159.3 -159.3
(165.6) (166.2)
Wage not = 3+1 x (Avg prior wage ≥ median) 308.6*
(182.5)
Wage = 3 x (Avg prior wage ≥ median) 305.9
(193.4)
Wage = 4 x (Avg prior wage ≥ median) 314.5
(202.3)
Constant 1,283 1,283 1,112 1,112
(187.8) (188.6) (146.1) (146.7)
Treatment effects by avg prior wage:
      [Wage = 3] + [Wage not = 3+1 x (Avg prior wage ≥ median)] -81.4
(101.3)
      [Wage = 4] + [Wage not = 3+1 x (Wage requested ≥ median)] -117.3
(104.8)
      [Wage = 3] + [Wage = 3 x (Avg prior wage ≥ median)] -82.8
(107.1)
      [Wage = 4] + [Wage = 4 x (Avg prior wage ≥ median)] -114.7
(115.3)
Sample
Observations 129 129 129 129
Adjusted R-squared 0.079 0.072 0.071 0.063
experienced with prior wages
Notes: All columns exclude all inexperienced workers since they do not have average prior wages, as well as 
26 experienced workers whose only prior jobs were fixed price contracts. Treatment effects by wage in the 
bottom panel are computed by taking the linear combination of a treatment dummy and the interaction of a 
treatment group dummy with (Avg prior wage ≥ median). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   	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Appendix Table 1: Robustness 
 
(1) (2)
Correct Correct
Wage = 3+1 omitted omitted
Wage = 3 -161.6** -133.4**
(64.20) (56.98)
Wage = 4 -156.9** -115.2*
(66.22) (62.43)
Constant 932.9 497.5
(52.05) (48.78)
Sample Taker + Excluded Taker + Excluded + non-Taker
Observations 266 540
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.009
Notes: Column 1 repeats the baseline analysis presented in Table 2, column 1 but includes results for the 36 
workers who did not complete exactly 4 hours of work due to a technical glitch. Column 2 includes results 
for the 36 excluded workers as well as for the 274 workers who did not accept our job offer. Workers who 
did not take up the job are coded as having completed 0 CAPTCHAs. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   